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Abstract. In this paper we provide an account of  the property-led boom and bust which 
has brought Ireland to the point of  bankruptcy. Our account details the pivotal role 
which neoliberal policy played in guiding the course of  the country’s recent history, but 
also heightens awareness of  the how the Irish case might, in turn, instruct and illuminate 
mappings and explanations of  neoliberalism’s concrete histories and geographies. To this 
end, we begin by scrutinising the terms and conditions under which the Irish state might 
usefully be regarded as neoliberal. Attention is then given to uncovering the causes of  
the Irish property bubble, the housing oversupply it created, and the proposed solution 
to this oversupply. In the conclusion we draw attention to the contributions which 
our case study might make to the wider literature of  critical human geographies of  
neoliberalism, forwarding three concepts which emerge from the Irish story which may 
have wider resonance, and might constitute a useful fl eshing out of  theoretical framings 
of  concrete and particular neoliberalisms: path amplifi cation, neoliberalism’s topologies 
and topographies, and accumulation by repossession.
Keywords: Ireland, fi nancial crisis, Celtic Tiger, housing, National Assets Management 
Agency, ghost estates, neoliberalism, path amplifi cation, accumulation by repossession, 
neoliberal topographies
Introduction
The Irish economic model which prevailed between 1993 and 2007 was widely heralded 
as a beacon of what the deep liberalisation of a small open economy might deliver. Indeed, 
the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ years saw a dramatic transformation in the social and economic 
life of a country that had, until the start of the 1990s, been a relatively poor and peripheral 
state, perched on the edge of Europe, with a weak indigenous economy and a foreign direct 
investment (FDI) sector characterised by low-skilled, branch-plant manufacturing. In the 
1990s Ireland embraced deregulation, entrepreneurial freedoms, and free-market principles 
and aggressively courted high-valued-added export-oriented FDI (see O’Riain, 2004). The 
result was a rapid shift to high-skilled manufacturing, a phenomenal growth in the service 
sector, the development of a domestic consumer society, a rapid growth in population through 
natural increase and immigration, and a housing and property boom (see Allen, 2007; Bartley 
and Kitchin, 2007; Jacobson et al, 2006; Moore and Scott, 2005; O’Hearn, 1998; O’Riain, 
2004). Politicians, policy makers, economists, academics, practitioners, think-tank gurus, and 
journalists from around the world fl ocked to Ireland to be inducted in the art of best practice 
in fast-track growth, and former Irish leaders have gone on global lecture tours espousing the 
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so-called benefi ts of the ‘Irish model’ of neoliberal economic reform for countries wishing to 
fast-track modernisation.
But since 2008, as a number of worldly dramas have unfolded, so too has the Celtic Tiger 
model unravelled. The domino effect of the global fi nancial crisis unearthed the fragility, 
overextension, and tenuous alignments of the international fi nancial markets. Since then, the 
world has been plunged into recession, some banks have collapsed, and others have been 
the recipients of generous tax-funded bailouts, and national and supranational governments 
have scrambled to resurrect their economies from the detritus of the recession. The effects of 
the international fi nancial crisis, while practically ubiquitous, have been felt more strongly 
and deeply in Ireland than in many developed countries. As a small open economy, Ireland 
was always going to be exposed to fl uctuations in the international markets (Jacobson et al, 
2006; O’Hearn, 1998), but the extent of this exposure was signifi cantly exacerbated by the 
home-grown infl ation of a property bubble (O’Toole, 2009). Indeed, the Celtic Tiger era of 
economic expansion was split into two periods: the fi rst period (1993 – 2002) characterised by 
export-led growth dominated by FDI and the second period (2002 – 07) involving a property 
boom mainly consisting of Irish developers capitalised by Irish banks who, in turn, were 
borrowing from European banks. 
As the global crisis deepened, the Irish property bubble burst and the vast overexposure 
of Irish banks to toxic property loans became apparent. The collapse of the property and 
banking sectors led to a contraction in the wider economy, with the drying up of credit, 
markets, and tax receipts, leading to a huge hole in the public purse; an extensive bank 
bailout, including the establishment of the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA) 
which has acquired €74 billion of property debt from Irish banks; bank recapitalisation (Bank 
of Ireland) and nationalisation (Allied Irish Bank, Irish Nationwide Building Society, Anglo 
Irish Bank); massive state borrowing to service the bank bailout and the public sector spend; 
rising unemployment; and plummeting house prices. Given the perilous economic state, this 
ultimately led to the €85 billion IMF – EU bailout in November 2010, and the collapse of the 
Fianna-Fail-led government in February 2011.
The response of the Irish government (like other national governments) thus far has 
amounted to ‘more of the same’: to patch up, rather than transform, the political economic 
system. As such, there is seemingly little appetite for any radical departure from orthodoxies 
and dogmas which have demonstrably failed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the international 
pressure, Ireland’s response to its crises represents little more than an anxious toeing-the-line 
in economic policy, kowtowing to the demands of the IMF, and nostalgically dreaming of 
those halcyon days of perpetual growth.  Indeed, Ireland is being touted as an exemplar of the 
benefi ts of austerity and is being held up as a model for Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain to 
follow. 
In many ways, the story of the rise and rise of neoliberalism in Ireland, the rise and fall of 
the Irish economy, and the Irish property boom and bust, provides an insight into the travails 
of proto-neoliberalism in the secular world. And yet to date there has been insuffi cient and 
inadequate dialogue between scholarship on neoliberal ideology and practice and the fate of 
Ireland’s Celtic Tiger. The relative paucity of such dialogue can be attributed to two sets 
of confusions: the appropriateness of the concept of neoliberalism and the failure to apprehend 
the Irish state as a neoliberal state. Firstly, the extent to which the term ‘neoliberalism’ may be 
said to map onto any meaningful empirical referent has become the subject of considerable 
debate (Larner, 2000). Indeed, within some intellectual communities, we note the palpable 
mood of hostility which has arisen against those who might use and abuse the notion 
(Hackworth, 2007). Whilst many commentators within Ireland, both populist and academic, 
speak loosely and often carelessly about an ‘Irish neoliberalism’, there remains within more 
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studied commentary a wariness in overstretching the concept and a nagging doubt about its 
utility. Secondly, in some respects Ireland postures as a somewhat ambivalent case study 
of neoliberalisation; ideologies of neoliberalism have come to assume a ‘commonsense’ 
status within the country’s political class to the extent that the term has rarely been explicitly 
articulated in national political debates. When it has been deployed by the Irish state itself, 
the label ‘neoliberalism’ has rather confusingly been bound up with the notion that the Irish 
economic model represents a hybrid formulation—to use the analogy popularised by former 
Tanaiste Mary Harney in 2000: somewhere between Boston (American neoliberalism) and 
Berlin (European welfarism). 
Undoubtedly, the limited application of scholarship on neoliberalism to Irish economic 
history has hampered, and been to the detriment of, academic comprehension of Ireland’s 
spectacular rise and fall, and in particular to scholarly appreciation of the roots of 
Ireland’s property boom and subsequent property crash. Reciprocally, it has also impoverished 
the ongoing agenda of fi guring out appropriate ways in which to theorise neoliberalism’s 
various past, present, and emerging actually existing forms. In this paper we propose that 
Ireland is indeed uniquely placed both to instruct and to be instructed by theoretical literature 
on neoliberalism and its discontents. We offer the ideas of path amplifi cation, neoliberalism’s 
topologies and topographies, and accumulation by repossession as central to the structuration 
of neoliberalism in Ireland and potentially useful additions to ongoing efforts to theorise 
neoliberalism’s wider biography.
An Irish neoliberalisation?
At the heart of the concept of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ is the notion that proto- 
neoliberalism is an economic experiment which has become woven into localities in different 
ways as a consequence of their unique social, cultural, economic, political, and institutional 
histories. Brenner and Theodore (2002, page 351) note the ‘path-dependent’ nature of neoliberal 
restructuring projects “insofar as they have been produced within national, regional, and 
local contexts defi ned by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, 
regulatory practices and political struggles.” In these divergent contexts they have identifi ed 
key moments of what they call “creative destruction”, involving the dismantling of particular 
institutional forms and the construction of new (de)regulatory apparatus. Other strands of 
work have argued for understanding neoliberalism in terms of governmentalities (Larner, 
2000), and as a ‘mobile technology’ (Ong, 2007). England and Ward (2007, page 8) suggest 
that there are important similarities, “discursively and materially in the ‘restructuring’ of 
markets for currency, energy, public services, transportation and so on”, which highlight 
the shared characteristics of state neoliberalisation, but that the contingency of the ‘project’ 
on place-specifi c market and regulatory structures means that it cannot be theorised as a 
coherent set of global processes.
The propagation of the ideology of neoliberalism, of course, betrays a long and colourful 
history. For instance, and representing only one example, before crashing onto the shores 
of both the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1980s in the guise of Thatcherism 
and Reaganism, neoliberalism was long experimented with and refi ned and rejigged in the 
context of Structural Adjustment Programmes imposed by the IMF on bankrupt nations 
in the developing world. There is certainly a tradition of scholarship which has preserved 
an interest in these multiple past and present laboratories. But it might also be argued that 
recent work within Anglo-American geography has tended to prioritise a limited number 
of case-study sites, both spatially and temporally. Firstly, Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) 
assertion that the urban scale now constitutes the most appropriate entry point for empirical 
explorations of the grounding of neoliberalism in concrete histories and geographies has 
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generated a disproportionate drift in interest towards the (Western) city. Secondly, to date, the 
principal antecedent context has been the Fordist Keynesian welfare state. Neoliberalism has 
generated a period of creative destruction and has junked, metamorphosed, and recalibrated 
previous Fordist Keynesian institutions. And much recent work has sought to develop the 
New Urban Politics literature to map a purported epochal transition in urban governance 
from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism (Cox, 1993; Cox and Mair, 1989; 
Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Harvey, 1989).
Arguably, the development of the concept of actually existing neoliberalism has been 
animated, but also limited, by the selective fi eld sites which Anglo-American geographers 
have chosen to work on. The Irish case endorses the need for a consideration of a wider 
range of scales of analyses and spaces and places and an appreciation of prior histories in the 
longue durée and a deeper reach into the past. Our proposition is that Ireland’s interlacing 
with neoliberal ideology has been mediated largely by institutions operating at the level of the 
nation-state and within a particular political culture and system infl ected by the long history 
of Anglo – Irish relations and the country’s emergence as an independent postcolonial state. 
In this sense the Irish case can be read as an exemplar of a much wider and richer historical 
geography of encounter between neoliberal ideology and the postcolonial legacy. We propose 
that Ireland’s neoliberal model has been shaped by at least four important historical factors.
First, British colonisation of Ireland, and annexation through plantation, has created a 
long history of confl ict in Ireland over ownership and propriatorial control over land and 
property. Historically, various strands of Irish cultural and political nationalism and Irish 
Republicanism foregrounded land and property ownership and land reform as central to their 
mission. Irish cultural and political life is thus marked by a fi erce and combative defence 
of the rights of the citizenry to exercise almost complete freedom and autonomy over land 
and property. Moreover, any such tendencies were compounded by the housing policies of 
successive governments after 1922, which, rather than adequately tackling social housing 
conditions, subsidised private-sector developers and mortgage lenders, therefore gradually 
pushing larger sections of the population into owner-occupation (see McCabe, 2011).
Second, living under the yoke of British political control, the Irish political model 
developed in ways which privileged local social relations and, in particular, a clientalistic and 
patronage species of politics. The craft of votes for favour and graft were honed in the rural 
Irish village and through time became sedimented and naturalised. The result is that Irish 
politics is marked by a triumph of local politics over party and national politics (see Collins 
and Cradden, 1997). This has been combined with a highly centralised bureaucracy inherited 
from the former British colonial administration (Breathnach, 2010, page 1186). Moreover, 
local politicians wield power in ways which have actively subordinated the Irish planning 
system. As a result, Irish planning has never achieved the same status as has planning in 
much of Europe, and has always been weakened and compromised by localism, cronyism, 
and corrupt political practices. 
Third, although Irish nationalism was infused with strains of Marxist and socialist 
politics, arguably Ireland’s revolution was one of the most conservative in modern history. 
Since Independence Irish political life has been dominated by the oscillating fortunes of two 
hegemonic, right-of-centre and conservative, nationalist parties: Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. 
These parties were formed out of the Irish Civil War and refl ect not left and right divisions in 
ideology but protreaty and antitreaty sentiments at the time of Independence. Irish political 
cleavages, then, for the most part do not pivot around ideological differences. 
Fourth, in the years immediately following Irish Independence, Ireland’s principal 
economic policy was one of import substitution. External capital was to be heavily regulated, 
limited, and policed, and domestic industries were to be nurtured and protected. By the late 
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1950s it was becoming evident that this model had impoverished, and continued to impoverish, 
Ireland. From the 1960s on Ireland embraced a model of a liberal and open economy and 
aggressively sought to court export-oriented manufacturing, piloting and adopting policies 
which would later be labelled ‘neoliberal’. 
These four factors shaping the Irish political landscape have produced a certain species 
of neoliberalism in Ireland which is perhaps best characterised as ideologically concealed, 
piecemeal, serendipitous, pragmatic, and commonsensical. Indeed, successive Irish 
governments have never had an explicit neoliberal ideology (apart from a small number of 
infl uential ministers) (Kirby, 2010). Ideology thus remains largely hidden in the apparatus 
of Irish politics. Its presence is barely articulated and often invisible. And yet Ireland was 
characterised over the Celtic Tiger period by a range of practices which bear important 
similarities discursively and materially with key processes of neoliberalisation (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). As opposed to an ideologically informed project, such as those implemented 
by Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the USA during the 1980s (see Harvey, 2007), Irish 
neoliberalism was produced through a set of short-term (intermittently reformed) deals 
brokered by the state with various companies, individuals, and representative bodies, which 
cumulatively restructured Ireland in unsustainable and geographically ‘uneven’ ways. 
Breathnach (2010) argues that the tension between the overwhelming concentration 
of employment and population in the east of the country and the political, clientelistic 
motivation towards ‘balanced regional development’ has resulted in an inability on the part 
of the state to make spatially selective decisions in order to plan strategically for economic 
growth. During the Fordist period, in which Ireland operated as a branch-plant manufacturing 
centre, this resulted in an extreme form of industrial decentralisation—manifested during 
the 1970s by the state’s construction of ‘advance’ factories in 156 locations—but was 
signifi cantly exacerbated from the 1980s onwards, once services became the main source of 
employment growth. Although intended as a way of addressing this imbalance, the National 
Spatial Strategy published in 2002 (DHELG, 2002) was effectively disabled by these same 
political features. Moreover, when export-led growth slowed down, the entrenched system 
of local clientalism was not superseded by indigenous entrepreneurship which capitalised on 
Ireland’s new industrial composition but, rather, new wealth was invested in property. The 
Irish state’s moves towards neoliberalisation, then, could be seen to operate at two scales: 
the international level, whereby the state attempted to create a vibrant and open economy 
which would attract FDI due to the ease of conducting business and generating profi t, and the 
national/local level whereby the state pandered to political allies by cultivating the conditions 
for a property boom, which was equally characterised by a lack of spatial selectivity. As the 
property sector began to take precedence over FDI as the major generator of state revenue, 
and due to reliance on indirect taxes from this sector, an economic model which could only 
perform adequately in a situation of perpetual growth was created. This need for perpetual 
growth was ingrained both structurally, in the state’s taxation system, and discursively, in the 
Celtic Tiger myth itself. 
The Irish neoliberal model ostensibly takes elements of American neoliberalism (minimal 
state, privatisation of public services, public – private partnerships, developer/speculator led 
planning, low corporate and individual taxation, light to no regulation, clientelism) and blends 
them with aspects of European social welfarism (developmental state, social partnership, 
welfare safetynet, high indirect tax, EU directives and obligations) (Kitchin and Bartley, 
2007). Rather than being the result of some well-conceived economic master plan, however, 
the Celtic Tiger was the outcome of a complex set of unfolding, interconnected, often 
serendipitous, processes held together by a strategy of seeking to attract and service FDI. Thus, 
Ireland exhibits a peculiar brand of ‘emergent’ neoliberalisation (McGuirk, 2005). The model 
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is perhaps better described as a series of disparate policies, deals, and actions which were 
rationalised after the fact, rather than constituting a coherent plan per se. As such, the claim 
that the Irish model sits politically somewhere between ‘Boston and Berlin’ is not so much 
an indication of a country pioneering a new model of neoliberalism, as it is suggestive of the 
ways in which new policies and programmes were folded into the entrenched apparatus of 
a short-termist political culture shadowed by low-level clientelism, cronyism, and localism 
which works to the detriment of long-term, statewide planning (O’Toole, 2009). 
Much of the policy transformations of the Celtic Tiger era movements were, then, to 
an extent the outcome of a certain political pragmatism—doing what was necessary at 
the time to satisfy the needs of various sectors of the voting public—rather than being 
characterised by clearly delineated periods of ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ neoliberalism 
(Peck and Tickell, 1994). The rolling out of neoliberal mechanisms, such as privatisation 
and public – private partnerships, was rarely handled in any sort of ideologically informed 
or systematic manner, and the state often failed to achieve the appropriate balance between 
private sector risk and public sector reward in these projects (Hurst and Reeves, 2004; 
Kirby and Jacobson, 2006; Palcic and Reeves, 2005; Reeves, 2003). Despite the relatively 
small receipts yielded to the taxpayer by privatisation, the state has continued to roll out 
privatisation into diverse service areas such as school buses, refuse collection, motor-vehicle 
testing, and urban car parking and clamping, and to initiate public – private partnerships with 
respect to public buildings, social housing, and road infrastructure (Barrett, 2004). However, 
while the state rolled out neoliberal policy mechanisms in fragmented and piecemeal ways 
into different sectors, this was not accompanied by an equivalent rolling back of social 
welfarism—unemployment and child support and other benefi ts remained relatively high—
although it should be noted that (a) the overall quality of services in many areas of the public 
sector (such as health, education, and public transport) failed to refl ect the magnitude of the 
dramatic transformations of the nation’s wealth during this same period (OECD, 2008); (b) 
social disadvantage was not adequately addressed during this period (NESC, 2005); and 
(c) the response to the current crisis has seen savage cuts in these same sectors. Moreover, 
rather than pitting the state against the trade unions, the period of Irish neoliberalisation was 
characterised by “the dense networks of institutions of ‘social partnership’ extending across 
all spheres of the political economy and integrating local actors, state agencies, and European 
Union Programmes … [that became] an institutional mechanism of public governance 
through almost all spheres of public life” (O’Riain, 2004, pages 9 – 10). These agreements 
traded work-related and pay-related concessions for union docility, and were used by the 
state as a means of manufacturing labour stability. Additionally, 
 “Unlike most other countries in Europe, Ireland has consistently rejected the model of 
decentralised decision making even in policy areas, which many observers might suggest 
are most sensibly located and managed by the local or regional sub-national levels of 
government. Ireland’s system of local governance is traditionally poorly organised, 
in receipt of very limited funding, and responsible for a very limited range of policy” 
(Stafford and Payne, 2004, page 3). 
As a result, Kirby and Jacobson (2006, pages 28 – 40) argue, the neoliberalisation of Ireland 
has been fl imsy and unsustainable and the Irish state failed to recognise that “market 
liberalisation requires a more robust and socially responsible state” to achieve equality and 
stability. Similarly the Irish state has failed to embed FDI industries adequately over the 
boom period through investing in and growing indigenous companies. Indeed, Ireland’s 
dependence on foreign investment is starkly identifi able by the degree to which GDP exceeds 
GNP (O’Hearn, 1998). 
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What we need to take away from this discussion is that these particularities of the Irish 
state’s fl irtations with neoliberalism are not anecdotal or an addendum to the technologies more 
‘representative’ of neoliberalisation globally. Rather, these particularities have been central to how 
actually existing neoliberalism has emerged in the Irish context. As such, we fi nd the concept of 
‘creative destruction’, which sits at the heart of ideas such as ‘path dependency’ and ‘path trajectory’, 
problematic and offer instead the concept of ‘path amplifi cation’. The relentless focus on the 
paradigmatic case of neoliberalism’s assault on and dismantling of Fordist Keynesian, and cultural, 
political, and historical infrastructures at the level of the city, has arguably effaced the recognition 
that in some cases neoliberalism actually fi nds itself in harmony with, rather than in opposition 
to, prior institutional histories. ‘Path amplifi cation’ points to the importance of forms of path 
trajectory in which history serves to amplify rather than slow down neoliberalism’s ambitions. 
Although often seen as a burden, weight, and source of friction, in fact in some cases pasts 
can serve as catalysts, lubricants, and wellsprings for neoliberal reforms. In light of these 
arguments, the following section looks more closely at the Irish property boom as indicative 
of the actually existing ways in which these processes converge. 
Actually existing neoliberalism in action: the Irish property boom and bust
In the ten years between January 1996 and December 2005 an unparalleled 553 267 housing 
units were built in Ireland to reach a total stock of 1.733 million units in 2005 (DEHLG, 
2009). By 2007 Ireland, along with Spain, was producing more than twice as many units 
per head of population than elsewhere in Europe (see fi gure  1). This building frenzy was 
accompanied by phenomenal growth in house prices. The average new-house price rose from 
€78 715 in Dublin and €66 914 for the country as a whole in 1991, to €416 225 in Dublin (a 
429% increase) and €322 634 for the country as a whole (a 382% increase) in 2007 (DEHLG, 
2009). Not unsurprisingly, secondhand homes followed the same trend, costing on average 
€76 075 in Dublin in 1991 and €64 122 for the country as a whole, rising to €495 576 in 
Dublin (a 551% increase) and €377 850 (a 489% increase) across the country in 2007. In the 
same period housebuilding costs and wages only doubled (Brawn, 2009). In Q3 of 1995, 
the average secondhand house price was 4.1 times the average industrial wage of €18 152; 
by Q2 of 2007 secondhand house prices had risen to 11.9 times the average industrial wage 
of €32 616 (Brawn, 2006).
Similarly, the cost of land spiralled, dramatically increasing in price in 2005 and 2006 
with land jumping in value from just under €10 000 per ha in 1998 to over €58 400 per ha in 
2006 (Savills HOK, 2007). This made Irish land the most expensive in Europe: nearly twice 
the price per hectare of any other European country, and three times greater than that in all 
but four countries (Spain, Northern Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands), despite there 
being a largely unrestricted planning system. Land-price infl ation was driven by developers 
competing for urban brownfi eld sites, agricultural land being sold for housing development, 
and individuals buying sites for one-off houses (Kelly, 2009). The result was that land 
became a signifi cant component of housing cost: up to 50% as against a European average of 
10 – 15% (O’Toole, 2009). 
Correspondingly, the total value of mortgage debt increased, from €47.2 billion in 2002 
to over €139.8 billion at the end of 2007, with the average size of a new mortgage being 
€266 000—nearly double the 2002 fi gure (CSO, 2008). Moreover, loans to developers for 
land and developments skyrocketed. As Honohan (2010, page 26) notes: 
 “At the end-2003, net indebtedness of Irish banks to the rest of the world was just 10 
per cent of GDP; by early 2008 borrowing, mainly for property, had jumped to over 
60 per cent of GDP. Moreover, the share of bank assets in property-related lending grew 
from less than 40 per cent before 2002 to over 60 per cent by 2006.” 
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By 2008 Ireland’s property bubble was already starting to defl ate slowly, but the global 
fi nancial crisis provided a redoubtable pin. 
The Daft.ie house-price report for Q4 of 2010 (Daft.ie, 2011) detailed that asking prices, 
based on stock advertised through its services, were down on average by approximately 
14% in 2009, on top of decreases of 19% in 2009 and almost 15% in 2008. The average 
asking price for a residential property was just over €222 000, €145 000 below the mid-2007 
peak. The drop in asking price from peak prices varies geographically, with the smallest 
drop in County Limerick (29%) and largest drop in Dublin city centre, where prices were 
down 49.6% at the end of 2010. According to the CSO (2011), house prices in Dublin are 
52% lower than at their highest level in early 2007. Apartments in Dublin are 58% lower 
than they were in February 2007. Residential property prices in Dublin are 54% lower 
than at their highest level in February 2007. The fall in the price of residential properties 
in the Rest of Ireland is lower at 42%. Overall, the national index is 46% lower than its 
highest level in 2007. Many economic commentators predict that house prices will fall by 
in excess of 60% from peak values (eg, Kelly, 2007; Whelan, 2010a). Similarly, rents fell 
for seven quarters in a row to Q1 of 2010, with private rents being almost 25% below their 
peak value in Q2 of 2008 (DKM, 2010). House prices have depreciated to the extent that 
over 250 000 households (approximately one third of all mortgages) are in negative equity 
and 62 970  households (8.1% of mortgages) are more than 90 days in arrears, and another 
36 376 had been restructured (Finfacts, 2011). Further, there has been a steep decline in 
land values since the height of the boom, reduced by 75 – 98%, depending on location. 
DKM (2010) reports that from 2006 to 2010 (estimated fi gures) the total value of 
construction output fell from €38 631 million to €11 733 (a drop of 69.6%). Further, the 
number of construction workers fell from their Q2 of 2007 peak of 269 600 to 105 700 in 
Q2 of 2011 (CSO, 2011). Property-related tax receipts (stamp duty, capital gains tax, VAT, 
development levies) have also dropped dramatically, because of the much smaller percentage 
of sales and the reduction in new commencements. 
It is now abundantly clear that, during the Celtic Tiger period, property supply and demand 
became disconnected so that when the bubble burst the state was left with a staggering level 
of oversupply. The particular ways in which the property sector emerged over the Celtic Tiger 
period offers an insight into both how the geographies of neoliberalism were spatialisised 
within the Irish context, and how this in turn has produced and deposited new neoliberal 
geographies. Whereas the literature has focused predominantly on the former category (the 
spread of neoliberalisation between places), we suggest that the landscapes and geographies 
which this subsequently secretes have been equally important in conditioning the course 
of neoliberal trajectories. These topographies and topologies of neoliberalism, therefore, 
warrant attention—not only as effects of neoliberalisation, but as also productive elements 
in the continuing evolution of neoliberal geographies. The way in which neoliberalism 
was contaminated and enfolded within the entrenched conditions of Ireland’s political and 
economic culture was instrumental in the articulation of specifi c relationships between 
the state, market, and civil society and in the deposition of particular geographies. These 
relationships, as manifested through the property bubble, produced a cannibalising form of 
capitalism (not unlike the practices which took down the international fi nancial markets) which 
evolved through a solipsistic fi nancialised logic: house prices rose while (counterintuitively 
to market logic) houses were built to excess. Ireland was in the middle of a building and 
land-speculation frenzy when the crisis initiated, and which, although it defl ated relatively 
fast, led to 244 590 units being built between January 2006 and December 2009 (the number 
connected to the ESB electricity grid). This is despite the fact that in April 2006 the Census 
revealed that 266 322 housing units were unoccupied (216 533 vacant units and 49 789 
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holiday homes—15% of stock). The preliminary results of the 2011 Census report a total 
housing stock of 2 004 175 of which 294 202 units were vacant (including holiday homes), 
with many areas of the country having vacancy levels above 25% (see fi gure  2)
One highly visible result of housing supply being out of sync with housing demand has 
been the creation of a new phenomenon: so-called ‘ghost estates’. Our research found that 
there were 620 such estates in Ireland at the end of 2009, where a ‘ghost estate’ was defi ned 
as a development of ten or more houses in which 50% of the properties are either vacant 
or under construction (Kitchin et al, 2010); a Department of the Environment and Local 
Government (DELG) survey in May 2010 revealed that there were 2846 unfi nished estates 
in the country, 777 of which meet the criteria of a ‘ghost estate’, and only 429 of which were 
active at the time of the survey. The total number of units in these estates is 121 248, with 
planning permission for an additional 58 025: 78 195 units are occupied. Of the 43 080 units 
that are unoccupied, 23 226 are complete, 9976 nearly complete, and there are 9854 on which 
construction has started. There are multiple numbers of unfi nished estates in every county in 
the state (see fi gure  3). 
Figure 2. Housing vacancy in Ireland.
Housing vacancy rate (%) (census 2011)
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In addition to housing and land, there is also an oversupply in offi ces, retail, and hotels. 
In Dublin 23% of offi ce space (some 782 500 m2) is vacant (Savills HOK, 2010). By the 
end of 2010, there was estimated to be over 2 million m2 of shopping centre space and 
1.32 million m2 of retail-park space in the state—double that in 2005 (CBRE, 2010). At the 
end of 2008 there were 905 hotels with 58 467 rooms—15 000 (26%) of which are deemed 
excess to demand (Bacon and Associates, 2009).
Much of the literature has highlighted that neoliberalisation entails not so much a 
retraction of the state as the deployment of different types of state interventions. Similarly, 
the Irish property bubble was not only the result of deregulated markets, but was facilitated 
by a range of contributory factors. There is no question that Ireland did, from the early 1990s 
onwards, need to cater for a signifi cant transformation in its demographic profi le. Between 
1991 and 2006 the population of Ireland grew by 714 129 (20.25%)—from 3.525 million to 
4.239 million, with the number of households growing by 440 437, up from 1.029 million 
to 1.473 million (CSO, 2006). The growth in population was driven both by immigration 
and by natural increase. Household growth was also driven by household fragmentation. 
Figure 3. [In colour online.] Vacant and unfi nished housing in estates in Ireland, May 2010 (source: 
National Housing Development Survey, 2010, preliminary data subject to validation corrections).
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One would have thought that such changes in demand would have been suffi cient to drive 
market response, but they were accompanied by a range of other policies and practices.
Tax-incentive schemes initiated under the 1986 Urban Renewal Act (Government 
of Ireland, 1986) allowed developers to claim back tax on income over a ten-year period, 
and were integral to kick-starting regeneration. Initially, the Department of Finance introduced 
tax incentives in order to promote growth and stability, particularly in inner-city areas. 
Urban renewal schemes were introduced “in an effort to alleviate the increasing problem of 
dereliction and dilapidation which had affected large parts on the inner areas of towns and 
cities nation-wide” (Department of Finance, 1999). A number of urban renewal schemes 
ran from 1986 to 2008 (the termination date depended on the scheme and a number were 
extended), including a Town Renewal Scheme (100 towns throughout the state covered), 
Living Over the Shop and a Seaside Resort Scheme (15 towns covered) which enabled access 
to Section 23 tax relief on capital expenditure incurred in the construction, refurbishment, 
or conversion of rented residential accommodation. Section 23 encouraged development 
for rental purposes (including holiday homes) by allowing developers and small investors 
to offset tax up to 90% of direct costs occurred against income for up to ten years. These 
schemes also marked the beginning of a new entrepreneurial approach to urban development 
in Ireland, which was specifi cally manifested in an effort to make Dublin fi t for purpose for the 
new forms of economy that were becoming spatially fi xed in cities in the postindustrial era. 
Many critics noted the neoliberal character of these urban strategies and, despite being 
widely criticised in terms of their redistributive effects on local areas (Corcoran, 2002), 
they were successful in terms of bringing new wealth to the capital and, over time, attempts 
were made to replicate the model in other Irish cities (O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007). The 
stimuli for development were supplemented with state-funded redevelopment projects such 
as the International Financial Services Sector in Dublin docklands, the Digital Hub, and the 
regeneration of Temple Bar as a cultural quarter, which were signifi cant in attracting inward 
investment in advanced producer services and digital industries (MacLaran and McGuirk, 
2001; Montgomery, 1995; Moore, 2008). These tax-initiative and redevelopment schemes 
were essentially deals struck between the Department of Finance and the private sector, with 
little role afforded to local authorities.
From June 1998, the urban tax-relief schemes were accompanied by the Pilot Rural 
Renewal Scheme for the Upper Shannon Region [introduced under the Finance Act, 1998 
(Government of Ireland, 1998)]. The scheme was designed to encourage people to live and 
construct new dwellings in designated areas and to promote new economic activity, and 
consisted of two main elements: (1) business tax incentives—tax relief for the expenditure 
incurred on the construction or refurbishment of industrial buildings (from 1 July 1999); and 
(2) residential property tax incentives—tax relief both for owner-occupiers and for renters 
(Department of Finance, 1999). The result was the massive incentivisation of building long 
after such incentives were no longer needed. In the case of the fi ve counties in the Upper 
Shannon Scheme—Longford, Leitrim, Cavan, Sligo, and Roscommon—housing stock was 
increased by 45 053 (49.8%) units between 2002 and 2009, from 90 491 to 135 544 dwellings, 
with one in three houses built in this period (see fi gure  4). Between the 1996 and 2006 Censuses 
30 695 houses were built in these counties and yet household numbers only grew by 18 896—in 
other words, housebuilding was progressing at a pace well in excess of household growth.
Running somewhat against notions of balanced and sustainable development advocated 
in national spatial planning policy, the boom in construction encouraged local authorities 
to be progrowth because this enabled the accrual of development levies (in the absence of 
more sustainable local residential property taxes), with local councillors pursuing zero-sum 
games with regard to their constituency where, if one area got a certain kind of facility or 
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development, then their area needed the same (hence, several regional shopping centres 
in each region instead of one). Chambers Ireland (2006) reported that development levies 
had risen from €0.11 billion to €0.55 billion between 2000 and 2005, representing 13.6% 
of local government expenditure. This is indicative of how new neoliberal interventions in 
the property sector were interwoven with the localised nature of Irish politics to produce 
particular spatial articulations of capital.
This was replicated at the national level through the government’s procyclical fi scal 
policy and taxation system, which worked both to boost the construction industry and to 
make it critical to sustaining public spending, rather than acting as a counterweight to ensure 
sustainable growth. Stamp duty, capital gains taxes, and VAT were signifi cant contributors 
to the public purse, despite the capital gains tax rate being halved, to 20%, in 1997, which 
was justifi ed by normative neoliberal faith in the market that if the sale and purchase of 
assets were less costly, this would free capital to be invested within the wider economy. 
Signifi cantly, development land was also included under capital gains tax, in an attempt to 
ensure that a greater amount of land was released for enterprise purposes. Davy Research 
(2006) reported that the property market accounted for 17% of total tax revenue in 2006, up 
from 5% in 1998. Revenues from stamp duty on property transactions were approximately 
€2.98 billion in 2006, up from €387 millon in 1998, and there were some €3.2 billion in VAT 
receipts (CSO, 2008, Davy Research, 2006). Stamp duty rates were lowered several times 
between 2001 and 2007, and the ceiling on income-tax deductibility of mortgage interest 
for owner-occupiers was increased four times between 2000 and 2008 in order to stimulate 
the housing market further (Honohan, 2010). In addition, a signifi cant number of people 
were employed in the construction and related sectors and construction was accounting for 
a signifi cant chunk of growth in GDP (in 2006 construction accounted for 9% of GDP and 
10.4% of GNP—DKM, 2008, cited by CSO, 2008). 
In turn, the planning system became beholden to development, being progrowth in 
orientation with a presumption for development operating, and was consistently undermined 
with localism, clientelism, cronyism, and low-level corruption. At the local scale, individuals 
and developers lobbied and sought to curry favour or do deals with county councillors 
and constituency TDs (members of the Irish Parliament) for zoning and permissions in 
return for support, votes, and remuneration of various kinds (favours, kick-backs, fees for 
‘planning consultancy’, etc). The Irish planning system lends itself to such a relationship 
as a result of its division of legislative and executive functions between councillors and 
Figure 4. Increases in housing stock in the upper Shannon Scheme (2002 – 2009).
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planners. The formulation and adoption of development plans and zoning decisions fall 
under the remit of elected local councillors; whilst the planning authority adjudicates 
over planning applications (with the planning authority being a part of the local authority 
which local councillors oversee). The function of local authority planners is to advise 
on all development planning matters, rather than being formal decision makers; elected 
representatives have the fi nal say on all development plan and zoning matters, and are under 
no obligation to take the recommendations of experts into account. Moreover, councillors 
can use mechanisms such as Section 140 [of the Local Government Act 2001 (Government 
of Ireland, 2001)—formerly Section 4 of the City and County Management (Amendment) 
Act, 1955 (Government of Ireland, 1955)] to override a specifi c planning decision. And, 
although local authority staff are legally bound not to engage in work that might imply a 
vested interest, there is no such monitoring for councillors. This is exemplifi ed by examples 
of elected representatives ‘double jobbing’ as planning agents (or consultants). 
The result was too few checks and balances to stop excessive zoning and permissions being 
granted, despite the fact that detailed demographic profi ling would have indicated limited 
demand in many locations, and the absence in many cases of essential services such as water 
and sewerage-treatment plants, energy supply, public transport, or roads. This is exemplifi ed 
with respect to land zoning. In June 2008, the Department of the Environment, Heritage and 
Local Government recorded that there were 14 191 ha of serviced land zoned nationwide for 
462 709 potential new units (and an additional 30 000 ha of unserviced zoned land), with many 
counties having enough land zoned to last many years. For example, Monaghan, which had a 
stock of 21 658 houses in 2006, had enough serviced land zoned for an additional 18 147 units, 
which would cater for a household increase of 83% and last over fi fty years if households 
continued to grow at the 1996 – 2006 rate. The national average is 16.8 years.
At the national level, developers and vested-interest organisations lobby and pressure 
ministers with respect to regional and planning policy formation and key legislation (Allen, 
2007). The property sector thus maintains close relationships with the major political parties, 
providing funding donations, the use of services and facilities, access to elite networks, 
employment/directorship careers after politics, and so on, in order to infl uence development 
plans, zoning and planning decisions, and planning policy. As the revelations of the Mahon 
Tribunal into planning corruption have suggested, this relationship has been characterised 
as one of mutual benefi t, along with the direct and indirect bribery and coercion of elected 
offi cials at all levels of government (see O’Toole, 2009). 
This vicious circle of politicians and developers was completed by the domestic banking 
sector, which got involved in a lending war driven by personal bonus schemes and interbank 
rivalry to generate record annual profi ts, fl ooding the market with development and mortgage 
capital which catered to speculator and buyer demand, but also actively encouraged it. Rather 
than using their own deposits to underpin loans, given the favourable lending rates, banks 
borrowed money from other international banks and private equity funds to offer ever-easier 
forms of credit to home buyers and investors. Utilising the international fi nancial markets for 
credit “greatly increased banks’ vulnerability to changing market sentiment” (Honohan, 2010, 
page 6). This reckless lending, often conducted without proper due process and exceeding 
stress-test criteria, was exacerbated by fi nancial deregulation and a regulatory system that 
failed to police the banking sector adequately (Murphy and Devlin, 2009; Ross, 2009). 
The involvement of international banks in the Irish property crash forms another critical 
component to understanding the relational geographies of the fi nancial crisis. The fl ow 
of international capital into Irish institutions effectively provided the means by which the 
property boom could occur. While we are acutely aware of the importance of these fi nancial 
fl ows to the predicament which Ireland currently faces, and indeed the fate of the entire 
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Eurozone, it is nevertheless both empirically and conceptually beyond the scope of the current 
paper to account for this in detail. Rather, we limit our analysis to the manifestations of these 
processes within Ireland.
The Honohan (2010) Report makes it clear that there were catastrophic regulatory and 
governance failures, both in the fi nancial sector itself (with respect to senior management 
decisions, bank auditors and accountants, and fi nancial intermediaries such as mortgage brokers) 
and in the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, which overemphasised 
process rather than outcomes, downplayed quantifi cation of risks, applied ‘light-touch’ 
and deferential regulation, and failed to implement any penalties for breaches of rules and 
regulations. Moreover, they created a false sense of security by producing reports which were 
overly optimistic and reassuring, regardless of the evidence base. This was compounded by 
similar reports from the IMF, OECD, and other bodies such as rating agencies and vested-
interest groups. As Honohan (2010) notes, Ireland’s banking performance was the second 
poorest after that of Iceland during the present global downturn, and this was entirely 
homemade on the basis of the Irish construction boom, rather than being due to exposure to 
subprime mortgages or aggressive overseas acquisitions.
The frenzy of housebuilding was exacerbated by the dispersed deployment of strong 
discourses around homeownership and buy-to-let or ‘fl ip’ speculation, combined with 
a simultaneous retreat from social housing provision. Ireland has a relatively high rate of 
homeownership, with almost three quarters of private dwellings in the state being owner-
occupied in 2006, and the housing boom was almost exclusively targeted at the homeowners 
and investors: fi rst-time buyers felt harried to get onto the property ladder at all costs (driven 
by arguments such as ‘being left behind’ and ‘rent is dead money’); existing homeowners were 
encouraged to take advantage of the equity in their homes to scale up or to purchase second 
or holiday homes, or to release equity to enable their children to get onto the housing ladder; 
and small investors were encouraged to invest in buy-to-let purchases as long-term, secure 
investments that lacked the volatility of stocks and shares. This last group was particularly 
important in keeping demand high and pushing up prices. By 2007 the Bank of Ireland Group 
were lending as much money (28%) to buy-to-let and fl ip speculators as to fi rst-time buyers, 
with the Irish Banking Federation noting that they typically paid some €100 000 more on a 
property purchase (Brawn, 2009).
Thus, Irish neoliberalism exhibits a particular form of path dependency which is indicative 
both of a commonsense approach to neoliberalisation and of the avoidance of its contradictions. 
While the Irish state essentially bought into a free-market ideology, the implementation of 
neoliberal policies and reforms in the property market were at the same time undermined 
by folding them into a system of entrenched localism, cronyism, and low-level corruption, 
both perpetuated and exacerbated by the interwoven short-term policy goals of the political 
system and the unsustainable circulation of capital between banks, developers, and investors. 
Thus, a range of state interventions in the property market perpetuated the privileging of the 
property market in geographic areas where, essentially, there was no market, and supported 
the capitalist accumulation of a small range of interests (who had close political ties), to the 
ultimate detriment of more sustainable redistribution of Celtic Tiger wealth. As O’Hearn 
(1998, page xi) observed:
 “The main benefactors of growth—foreign computer fi rms and Irish professionals—
disposed of most of their fortunes in ways that were either fruitless (in the case of profi ts 
removed from Ireland) or downright harmful (property speculation that drove the costs 
of housing through the roof).”
The result of these various factors, underpinned by a neoliberal philosophy of free-
market development and market-led regulation, was a housing bubble. Although many of 
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the factors we have discussed do not differ greatly from the role that property development 
and speculation plays in many nations undergoing neoliberalisation, the ways in which these 
factors were articulated in Ireland was also contingent upon its particularities. The sheer 
frenzy around homeownership was clearly a latent outcome of a postcolonial anxiety around 
land, exacerbated by government housing policies that supported developers and speculators 
over households (McCabe, 2011), itself indicative of the administrative defi cit stemming 
from postcoloniality. Rather than being a mere footnote illustrating the more recent (and 
thus important) histories explaining the property boom, the postcolonial context was in fact 
integral to how it was produced and sustained over time: without the widespread desire for 
homeownership at any cost, the ever-escalating market could not have been sustained for as 
long as it was. Similarly, the inherent localism and cronyism of Irish politics produced a 
series of effects which structured the property sector, its geographical manifestation, and the 
architecture of its downfall. Ireland provided a lubricated laboratory for neoliberal expansion, 
wherein resistance to these reforms was minimal, and their articulation exhibits a type of path 
amplifi cation that mutates both Ireland and the ‘neoliberal’. The variants of neoliberalism 
produced must be seen in light of these historic specifi cities, but cannot be reduced to that 
which is predictable or foreseeable. Ireland’s geography and the ‘neoliberal’ mutate together 
and amplify each other.
The government’s solution to the banking and property crisis: NAMA
The government’s response to the banking and property crisis in Ireland has been 
characteristic of the short-termist and reactionary modus operandi of Irish politics which 
then unfolds into a de facto longer term response (O’Toole, 2009; Ross, 2009). Rather than 
rethink the Irish economic model, the solution to the crisis has employed a deepening of 
neoliberalised policy designed, on the one hand, to protect as much as possible the interests 
of the developer and fi nancial class, and, on the other, to implement widescale austerity 
measures and severe cutbacks in public services and to consider the privatisation of state 
assets—all framed within a postpolitical discourse of ‘there is no alternative’. Although this 
is perhaps unsurprising given the prevalence of similarly hermetic responses elsewhere, and 
the ability of neoliberalism to mutate to reinforce certain types of class power at the expense 
of others (Harvey, 2007; see also Fox-Rogers et al, 2011 for a review of how changes in Irish 
planning law reinforces class bias)—in particular utilising and mobilising crisis as a way of 
solidifying these arrangements (Klein, 2008; Žižek, 2010)—it is worthwhile to elaborate 
empirically on how such processes were operationalised and rationalised in the Irish context 
with respect to property.
The government’s initial reaction to the faltering economy was to insist that the banks 
were well capitalised and that the housing market would slow to ‘soft landing’. However, 
as the crisis deepened and liquidity started to dry up on the international money markets, 
it became clear that there were signifi cant problems of capitalisation in the Irish banking 
sector. Banks neither had the funds to lend to investors and businesses, nor to pay back loans 
to international banks. Irish bank share prices collapsed (between May 2007 and November 
2008 Irish shares fell in value from €55 billion to €4 billion) resulting in the introduction 
of a state-backed bank-guarantee scheme to prevent a run on the banks, wherein the state 
underwrote €440 billion of deposits and other assets (Murphy and Devlin, 2009). Property 
buyers and investors, already cautious because of the slow down in the housing market, 
found it increasingly diffi cult to source credit, thus developers found themselves left with 
liquidity problems which prevented them from fi nishing out developments. If evidence was 
needed of the failure of the neoliberal model not only to provide equitable redistribution, 
but also to support those interests most central to its functioning, this case offered a clear 
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example. In order to introduce liquidity into the Irish banking system, the state took a two-
pronged approach: (1) direct recapitalisation or nationalisation, wherein the state took a stake 
in the banks for preferential shares or took direct ownership, using the national pension reserve 
and fi nance procured on the international markets; (2) relieving the banks of their toxic assets 
by purchasing all property loans of €5 million or more issued before 1 December 2008 
and placing them in a new state agency to manage on behalf of the taxpayer. Somewhat 
controversially, all Irish banks were to participate in the strategy adopted, meaning that the 
two institutions with the smallest depositor base and largest portfolio of toxic debt (Anglo 
Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide) were protected from being wound down.
The new property agency appointed to manage the second scheme is the NAMA, part 
of the National Treasury Management Agency. Plans for NAMA were announced in the 
Minister for Finance’s Supplementary Budget on 7 April 2009, with the National Asset 
Management Agency Act 2009 published on 10 September 2009 (Government of Ireland, 
2009). The Act enables NAMA to acquire bank assets relating to land and development loans 
and associated loans, and to manage those assets for the benefi t of the taxpayer. The fi rst 
loans were transferred from the banks to NAMA on 29 March 2010.
The NAMA (2009) Draft Business Plan details that, in total, €88 billion worth of assets 
with a loan book of €77 billion and €9 billion in rolled-up interest, were to be transferred to 
NAMA from fi ve Irish banks (AIB— €24.1 billion, Bank of Ireland— €15.5 billion, EBS—
€0.8 billion, Irish Nationwide— €8.3 billion, and Anglo Irish Bank— €28.4 billion); of this, 
€27.8 billion (36%) relates to ‘land’, €21.8 billion (28%) relates to ‘development loans’, and 
€27.7 billion (36%) relates to ‘associated loans’. After court cases, in the end €74 billion 
was transferred. In return for the impaired assets, the agency issued the fi ve banks with 
government-backed bonds, which the banks could use to borrow from the European Central 
Bank and thus, in theory at least, inject liquidity into the Irish banking system. Rather than 
paying the current market value of the underlying assets, NAMA paid 15% more—to represent 
long-term economic value. The state eventually paid €32 billion for the assets, although the 
developer will continue to repay the full value of the loan. NAMA estimates that 40% of the 
loans will be cashfl ow generating and that 80% of loans will be repaid by borrowers, with 
20% defaulting. NAMA has up to €5 billion to spend selectively on completing projects.
At present, there is very little detail available with respect to the 22 000 loans which have 
been transferred into NAMA and to the properties they relate, nor the specifi c geography 
beyond national territories (see table  1). As a consequence, it is diffi cult to determine the 
present status of assets and their future potential worth. 
Since its announcement, the NAMA project has been roundly criticised by politicians 
and economists (see, eg, Gurdgiev, 2010; Lucey, 2010; Lyons, 2010; McWilliams, 2010; 
Whelan, 2010b). There is a broad concern as to whether NAMA has been the right vehicle 
to deal with the property crisis and whether it can succeed given the makeup of the portfolio 
(particularly given the geography of assets and the amount of land and redundant property 
such as ‘zombie hotels’), the extent of the property crash, the sums being paid by the state 
to the banks for their ‘assets’, the validity of ascribed long-term economic values and rent 
yields, and the veracity of valuations and underlying economic models and calculations. 
Others question the fact that NAMA has paid a notional long-term economic-value rate, 
rather than present market prices, thus second guessing the market and infl ating the transfer 
to the banks at the state’s risk; and that to recover the state investment the property market 
will need to be reinfl ated, which will mean the reinfl ation of the surrounding apparatus of 
interests in banking, property, planning, and government. Moreover, if land is purchased by 
the state on the basis of existing zoning, then any future dezoning by local authorities will 
defl ate its value and lead to a loss on the investment. 
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For those on the right NAMA represents state interference in the logic of the free market, 
disrupting its ‘natural’ recovery by artifi cially controlling large elements of the property market 
and protecting failed developers and speculators in the short term who otherwise would have 
gone bust, thus blocking the growth of more resilient players or new start-ups. For those on 
the left it protects those who created the crisis but it does nothing to protect homeowners 
and tenants struggling to pay mortgages and rent who are also underwriting NAMA’s costs. 
Moreover, it is employing as experts (bankers, estate agents, property consultants, planners, 
lawyers) the very same people who acted irresponsibly to create the bubble, some of whom 
are overseeing transfers from their former employers. These experts are being handsomely 
rewarded for their services, with fees expecting to run to €2.46 billion over the projected 
ten-year life course of the agency (NAMA, 2009). Further, NAMA is exempt from freedom-
of-information requests and, despite managing a vast amount of state-managed assets, it is 
particularly opaque in its operation. 
Interestingly, very few of the critiques of NAMA question the underlying neoliberal 
ideology which underpins the creation and operation of the agency and the whole Irish 
economic model. Indeed, there seems to be widespread acceptance that the core logics and 
principles underpinning Ireland’s economy during the Celtic Tiger period were fundamentally 
sound, and that the crisis and crash were simply the result of misfortune with respect to the 
timing of the global fi nancial crisis, poor management and regulation, and cronyism and 
greed [in other words, how it was (mis)applied]. In general, then, criticisms do not extend 
to the Irish economic model, with its narrow tax base of low rates of corporate and income 
tax, high indirect taxes, and lack of property taxes, and its laissez fair approach to planning 
and regulation. As Marcuse (2009) has noted, ‘today’s-more-than-fi nancial-crisis’ is being 
rationalised away as an anomaly within the system of neoliberal capitalism—a cog to be 
corrected, rather than indicative of more systemic failures.
 In Ireland, as with other countries, the solutions to the crisis are a selection of alternative 
tactics wherein the overall strategy is a new round of neoliberalisation. In other words, rather 
than seeking radical (or even moderate) change with respect to the economic, political, and 
planning systems, a fresh dose of neoliberalisation is seen as the solution to the failings of 
previous rounds of neoliberalism. The apparatuses which created the conditions for crisis are 
not only left in place, their positions are strengthened through affi rmation. Harvey (2007) 
argues that the neoliberal project was designed as a means to restore class power to an elite 
by strategically aligning state resources and supports to this strata of society. The Irish state’s 
Table 1. Geographical breakdown of NAMA portfolio (in € billion) (source: NAMA, 2009).
Land and develop- 
ment loans
Associated 
loans
Total Percentage 
of total
Ireland 33.13 18.35 51.48 66.80
Northern Ireland 3.29 1.51    4.80 6.20
Great Britain 10.34 5.59 15.93 20.70
USA 1.39 0.66 2.05 2.70
Germany 0.05 1.01 1.06 1.40
Portugal 0.46 0.14     0.60 0.70
France 0.39 0.13 0.52 0.70
Czech Republic 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.20
Italy 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.20
Spain 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.20
Other 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.30
Total 49.38 27.73 77.11 100.00
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response to the crisis supports this argument. It is indicative of free-market fundamentalism 
“losing both its claim to legitimacy and its claims on democracy” (Giroux and Searls Giroux, 
2009, page 1), having to abandon the assumption that markets can operate in the absence 
of state interventions. In Ireland, we are now witnessing the rolling out of public money 
and resources to rescue poorly performing private institutions and to rescue a faulty system 
from ruin—an example of what we term ‘accumulation by repossession’. In a period of ‘roll 
with it’ neoliberalism (Keil, 2009), the investment in these types of responses has reached 
a point where it is less politically contentious to continue to invest in these ideologically 
contradictory responses of state-regulated free markets than either to follow through on the 
promise of the free market or to implement more socially responsible models. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have sought to bring the Irish economic ‘miracle’ which prevailed between 
1993 and 2007, and its spectacular collapse since 2008, into dialogue with recent literature 
on neoliberalism, its actually existing forms, and its path trajectories in specifi c and concrete 
milieu. Given its pivotal status in the global debate on fast-track growth in small open 
economies and on the causes and consequences of collapse and crises, we note a surprising 
absence in the academic literature of sustained conversation between the Irish case and 
theoretical ruminations over neoliberalism and its political pretensions today. This paper 
stands as a contribution towards the fi lling of this lacuna. Our discussion has focused upon 
the causes of the massive property orgy which Ireland indulged in at the height of its prowess 
as a Celtic Tiger, the disastrous social and spatial costs and consequences that this glut has 
left in its wake, and the (re)commitment to neoliberal policies which the proposed solutions 
to Ireland’s property crises betray.
At one level, the follies, excess, gluttony, greed, defaults, bankruptcies, repossessions, 
and bail-outs which have marked Irish life in the past two decades refl ect simply the cultural 
fl otsam and jetsam of a classic crisis of overaccumulation. Inherent in the capitalist system 
is a tendency towards overaccumulation, signposted by a series of desperate displacement 
strategies which include the switching of capital from primary circuits to secondary circuits 
and, in particular, into land and property. Overheated housing markets are emblematic of the 
endemic and innate drift of capitalism into spatially and temporally specifi c crises which are 
then exacerbated by the will of capitalism to fi nd what turn out to be fallacious solutions. 
Ireland’s particular and dramatic encounter with the creative and destructive powers of 
unregulated and insuffi ciently regulated market processes is but the latest chapter in the 
now well populated and inglorious history of capitalism and property bubbles more widely. 
Ireland’s crises are simply capitalism’s crises rendered visible and naked.
But Ireland’s story was home grown too. Both fi scal and planning policy formation, 
implementation, and regulation were overtly shaped by the neoliberal policies adopted by 
the state, particularly in the period from 1997 onwards. During this time, the government 
pursued a neoliberal agenda of promoting the free market, minimising regulation, privatising 
public goods, and keeping direct taxes low and indirect taxes high. The state thus loosened 
regulation of the fi nancial sector, introduced tax-incentive schemes, changed the parameters 
of stamp duty, lowered capital gains tax, allowed developers to forego their affordable 
and social housing obligations, promoted a laissez faire planning system, failed to address 
the vestiges of clientelism and allowed elected representatives to abandon basic planning 
principles, and encouraged local authorities to produce ambitious, localised growth plans 
framed within a zero-sum game of potentially being left behind with respect to development. 
In short, it allowed the property sector to be driven by developers, speculators and banks, 
rewarding them with tax incentives, less tax obligations, and market-led regulation; it enabled 
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buyers to overextend their indebtedness; and it provided too few barriers to development 
by failing to oversee, regulate, and direct local planning adequately. Although the global 
fi nancial crisis might have been a contributing factor, the Irish housing market was already 
running out of control, with supply outstripping potential demand in all parts of the country, 
and house and land prices skyrocketing to amongst the most expensive in the world. And 
banks had massively overextended themselves in their lending to developers. The crash was 
inevitable. The severity of the crash was signifi cantly exacerbated by the state’s neoliberal 
agenda and lack of oversight and foresight and poor policy formation with respect both to the 
planning system and to the banking sectors.
In mobilising the idea of actually existing neoliberalism, we have made a case for 
widening the laboratories within which the grounding of neoliberalism is scrutinised. We 
have argued that the vital context which has mediated Ireland’s specifi c encounter with 
neoliberal doctrines has been Irish attachments to land and property, Ireland’s coloration by 
clientalistic and patronage politics, the dominance of right-of-centre political parties which 
prioritise localism, and the desire for an FDI-dominated, open economy which collectively 
helped broker the rise and fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy, and have given the property 
bubble and its implosion a unique Irish fi ngerprint. We have characterised Irish neoliberalism, 
then, as a commonsense, partial, happenstance, and emergent piling up of market-oriented 
policies, strategies, and instruments, framed within its localist, clientelist political culture and 
system that operates across modes and scales of governance.
In framing Ireland’s encounter with neoliberalism in terms of the country’s emergence 
from a troublesome colonial past we are not, of course, suggesting that Ireland is particularly 
exceptional. It may be that Ireland’s puzzling conservative revolution, its brand of clientalistic 
and patronage politics, its culture of reverence towards and deferral to property rights, and 
its rejection of import substitution and embrace of open markets, resonates with other states 
emerging from a colonial experience. To the extent that the social, cultural, economic, and 
political milieu in which neoliberalism took root in Ireland might be more typical than 
unique, arguably the theoretical innovations piloted in this paper assume wider signifi cance. 
Although to date much work on actually existing neoliberalism has been focused upon the 
creative destruction of institutions of urban governance in the Western city, the Irish case may 
well serve to invigorate a fresh focus upon neoliberalism’s journeys in states which still carry 
the imprint of their colonial past and in which colonial and postcolonial histories provide the 
essential context in which the structuration of the neoliberal experiment takes place. The 
Irish case can be located against the backdrop of neoliberalism’s early experimentation in 
Structural Adjustment Programmes, but it clearly surpasses, extends, and suggests new 
directions for scholarship with this parentage.
In concluding, we ruminate on the wider signifi cance of the Irish case for critical human 
geographies of actually existing neoliberalism in the context of the global economic crises. To 
this end, we offer three concepts which emerge from the Irish story but which may have wider 
resonance and might constitute a useful fl eshing out of theoretical framings of concrete and 
particular neoliberalisms; path amplifi cation, neoliberalism’ s topologies and topographies, 
and accumulation by repossession.
Firstly, the concepts of path trajectories and path dependencies have become important 
denotations of the place-specifi c character of local and particular neoliberalisms and their 
development. Because emphases to date have tended to be focused upon neoliberalism’s 
working on antecedent, city-based Fordist Kenyesian institutions and infrastructures, the 
concept of ‘creative destruction’ has tended to be foregrounded, both cerebrally and viscerally. 
The idea of ‘creative destruction’ itself implies that, to move forward, neoliberalism has 
to destroy prior spatial and ideological fi xes. The idea of neoliberalism’s path trajectories 
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and path dependencies has become preoccupied with ideas of friction and inertia: obstacles 
have to be overcome. Given Ireland’s unique social, cultural, economic, and political history, 
arguably neoliberalism encountered a more conducive incubator here. Perhaps for this reason 
it did not have to become an overtly political and ideological project as such and was paraded 
as little more than commonsense. To counter assumptions of friction, inertia, and stasis which 
can unwittingly pervade concepts such as path dependency and path trajectory, we offer the 
idea of ‘path amplifi cation’. In some spaces and places neoliberalism fi nds itself in harmony 
with, rather than in opposition to, prior institutional histories and can germinate exponentially 
and benefi t from local amplifi cation.
Secondly, although much work to date has been focused upon geographies of 
neoliberalism, it is equally the case that neoliberalism produces its own geographies. 
We refer to this as ‘neoliberalism’s topographies and topologies’. All too often, the full 
signifi cance of these geographies and their importance in conditioning the subsequent path 
trajectories of neoliberalism are insuffi ciently understood; where they are ill defi ned and 
underspecifi ed notions of uneven development are mobilised. The importance of debates 
over ghost estates and zombie hotels to the future trajectory of neoliberalism in Ireland merits 
attention. Alongside Dubai and Japan, Ireland might become the most appropriate laboratory 
within which to study the impact of such haunted landscapes of despair on the future of 
neoliberal thinking and its possible mutations. The growth in the Irish housing market, both 
in terms of revenue and land use, and the subsequent crash and legacy of oversupply, has 
had an era-defi ning impact on Irish society and space. It has affected all aspects of social and 
economic life in urban and rural communities, leaving in its wake a topology of vacancy, 
unfi nished estates, and empty offi ces and retail parks and a topography of broken lives, 
shattered dreams, terminal indebtedness, and, for some, chronic stress, anxiety, depression, 
and even suicide. Neoliberalism’s spatial imprint needs to be considered as central to its 
structuration, both before and during the present crises.
Thirdly, worryingly, the present government’s solution to the crisis has been another 
round of short-termist neoliberalism in the form of the public collectivisation of private debt 
through detoxifi cation, recapitalisation, and nationalisation of the banks and the protection 
of the interests of developers and speculators at the potential expense of the taxpayer. We are 
entering, it seems, a period in which capitalism is folding in on itself: where perhaps one would 
expect it to implode, instead it regenerates and thrives on its own contradictions: “the more it 
breaks down, the more it schizophrenizes, the better it works” (Deleuze and Guattarri, 1977, 
page 166). We are seemingly entering a period of paranoid, schizoid, and cynical neoliberal 
capitalism, wherein any utopian dream of effi ciency through markets, democracy through 
accumulation, has been lost within the scrapheap of the international crisis. Ireland has been 
buried under this detritus more than most. According to Harvey (2007), the recent history of 
neoliberalism can be read as a decisive development in the class war over the division of the 
national product. Through what Harvey (2003) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’, capital 
has reversed the gains to labour which were ushered in with the Fordist Keynesian state and 
restored inequalities in wealth to Victorian levels. In Ireland’s case, capital is being saved 
from its later folly not only by the privatisation of social assets but also by the socialisation 
of private loss. Productive state assets are to be deployed to save and, in some cases, further 
(perhaps more than we currently know about) enrich capital, whilst capital’s losses are to 
become the public’s losses. We suggest the concept of ‘accumulation by repossession’ 
to capture this latest development and offer it as an accompaniment to Harvey’s concept of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’.
In the present postpolitical climate of manufactured amnesia it is useful to remind 
ourselves that a different future remains possible—despite the fact that Ireland’s neoliberal 
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state seems presently incapable of envisioning and embracing another future. Indeed, it is 
somewhat ironic that in many ways the Irish state has never been better placed to choose 
a different future, given the state ownership of huge tracts of land and property, along with 
the country’s primary banking institutions. The era of neoliberalism, however, has also 
seismically  shifted the context of the state into which such reforms/reclamations would 
need to be implemented. Gleeson (2010), in his book Lifeboat Cities, likens the past thirty 
years of welfare retrenchment and the rise to prominence of neoliberal rule as akin to being 
‘handcuffed to a madman’. During this period, Gleeson suggests, we have witnessed a period 
of reconstitution in which sociospatial relations have degenerated such that they are no 
longer fi t for purpose for human fl ourishing. For Gleeson the global economic downturn has 
raised the stakes and created new opportunities. No longer must the call to resist or contest 
neoliberalism rest on an agenda of moderate reform. The scale of the task is now so great, 
and the sense of urgency so crushing, that much more ambitious thinking is required. Perhaps 
the core of the problem lies in what Žižek (2002, page 152) considers the difference between 
the capacity of states and individuals to react and to act:
 “An act always involves a radical risk ... it is a step into the open, with no guarantee of the 
fi nal outcome ... [b]ecause an Act retroactively changes the very co-ordinates into which 
it intervenes.”
Thus far, the Irish response to the crisis—like that of many other nations—has been to react 
rather than to act, thus exhibiting a fundamental conservatism which seeks to recover, rather 
than to reform. To a certain extent this is now inevitable given the complex interweaving of 
political and economic geographies, the new postcrisis relational geopolitical confi gurations 
both within and external to the Eurozone, and the embrace of the IMF/ECB bailout, which 
enable and constrain the ground on which national institutions can react to and act upon the 
crisis. But perhaps only in taking that step into the unknown can Ireland begin the search for 
the opportunity inherent within crisis.
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